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More than two years have now elapsed since the conclusion of the three—part
series in Issues 36 (October 1983), 37 (April 1984), and 40 (October 1985), which 
analyzed the major changes in the structuring and leadership of the Armed Forces
inaugurated in March 1983. These two years have witnessed some significant develop­
ments which warrant a revised format for the "Current Data on the Indonesian
Military Elite" series. The two main modifications involve dropping the listing of
positions in the Department of Defense and Security (Hankam), and including new
data on regional leaderships at the Kodam (Military Region Command) and the Korem
(Military Resort Command) levels. In the analysis offered in issue no. 37, it had 
been argued that Law 20/1982, formally separating the functions of Minister of 
Defense/Security and Commander—in—Chief of the Armed Forces, would reduce the
former to  political insignificance, while creating an enormous concentration of power
in the latter. The past two years have confirmed the validity of this prognosis, to
the point that it seems largely irrelevant to  chart personnel transfers within the 
Department of Defense/Security. On the other hand, the territorial reorganization
of 1985, by which the old combined-service interregional commands (KowiRian) were 
abolished, and the number of Kodam reduced from sixteen to  ten seems to  have run 
into some obstacles, so that attention is warranted particularly to those regions
which prior to  1985 were Kodam—level, but were subsequently reduced to  Korem 
status. Furthermore, since Commander—in—Chief General Murdani has made clear
that the Korem commands are to  be key jobs for middle—ranking officers destined
for top military and political posts in years to  come, it will probably be useful to
start keeping a systematic eye on Korem leaderships, as weR as on the chief—of—
staffships of the ten Kodam. In Issue 46 (October 1968) an attempt will be made 
to give fufl listings with some preliminary analysis.
/. Structural—Sociological Developments
A  Generational
The past two years have seen the retirement from active service of all members 
of the so-called *45 Generation, and virtuafly aR those of the "bridging" generation 
(i.e., the products of the Yogyakarta MHitaiy Academy of 1948 and 1949, the Dutch 
Military Academy at Breda, and the P3AD (Army Officer Training Center] of the 
early 1950s). Retirement has normally meant taking up new positions in the Depart­
ment of Defense, as well as other ministries and government agencies, seats in 
parliament, ambassadorships, or jobs in s ta te - or state-supported enterprises.1 The 
sole "bridger" left on active duty is the Commander—in-C hief himself, and he would
1. One important exception is Breda-educated M aj. Gen. Soebijakto Prawirosoebroto 
(long-tim e deputy to  Murdani while the latter was Armed Forces’ inteHigence czar) 
who has been kept on, in retirement, as Governor of Lemhannas.
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have been required to  retire at the end of October 1987, had President Suharto 
not granted him a special one-year extension.
The result of these retirements has been the rise to  leadership of the first 
two graduating classes (1960 and 1961) of the Military Academy (AMN), with the
former predominating in top staff jobs in Jakarta, and the latter in the key regional
commands. Class Three (1962) graduates have still, with a couple of notable excep­
tions, to  make their mark beyond the Korem level. The men of Classes One and
Two were bom between 1935 and 1938, were young boys during the Revolution, in
their early thirties at the time of the 1965 ■Coup," in their early forties when the
East Timor W ar began in 1975, and are today in their early fifties. (In so far as 
they have real combat experience (and a good many do not], it has been in East
Timor, and the experience has not been notably successful.)
B. Setvice and Ethnicity
In the earlier analyses, it had been pointed out that the rise of the AMN  
graduates meant the ascendancy of a group of officers whose formative experiences 
and emotional solidarities derived from the classroom, rather than from anticolo-
nial guerrilla warfare. Hence a rapid decline was predicted in the importance of 
affiliation with the historic territorial Divisions (Siliwangi, Diponegoro, Brawijaya, 
etc.) which were bom during the Revolution of 194S-1949. This prediction is largely 
confirmed by the way in which printed minibiographies of leading AMN graduates 
are now organized. There are only rare mentions of Divisional attachment, while 
emphasis is typically placed on technical service branch (Infantiy, Artillery, Cavalry, 
Engineers, and so on). As might be expected from the pattern in other modem
militaries, Infantry is, formally at least, the privileged branch, but the others are
quite well represented. Unofficially, however, it is pretty dear that experience in
■InteHigence" may be the single most significant qualification for leadership in the 
Suharto—Murdani era. A  rough calculation on the basis of fragmentary evidence 
suggests that well over one-third of all the officers listed in this issue have "Intelli­
gence" backgrounds of one kind or another.
In ethnic terms, the Javanese are overwhelmingly dominant (wed over 70 percent
of the current listing). Sundanese come next, but, at less than 10 percent, a very 
long way behind. After them, a minimal scattering of Batak, Balinese, Minangkabau,
Buginese, and so on. Seven of the ten Kodam commanders are Javanese, while one 
is Sundanese and two Batak. It is not altogether clear why Javanese dominance 
should still be so strong. In earlier years the obvious explanation was the concen­
tration of Republican combat troops in Java and Sumatra during the Revolution,
and the expulsion of most Sumatran revolutionary-era military leaders during the 
civil war of the late 1950s. But the Military Academy, as designed by General Nasution
and others in the late 1950s, was intended to  overcome ethnic jealousies by recruiting
on a broadly proportional, demographic basis, with no favoritism for the Javanese 
as such. That Indonesia today has, in Ida Bagus Sudjana and I Gde Awet Sara, two 
very prominent Balinese generals, while there were no Balinese generals at all in 
the entire ’45 Generation, shows the sincerity and effectiveness of the Nasution 
policy. Thus the ascendancy of AMN Javanese probably occurred in the 1970s by a 
selective promotion process— whether for political reasons or not remains uncertain.
C. The Regional Pattern
The territorial reorganization discussed in Issue no. 40 has produced a structure 
consisting of ten Kodam and thirty-nine Korem. Kodam 1 (N. Sumatra) has six Korem, 
2 (S. Sumatra) has four, 3  (W. Java) has four, 4 (C. Java) has four, 5 (E. Java)
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has four, 6 (Kalimantan) has four, 7 (Sulawesi) has five, 8 (W. Irian and the Moluccas) 
has four, 9 (Lesser Sundas) four, and 10 (Metropolitan Jakarta) none. Kodam 2, 3, 
4, 5, 9, 10 are more or less unchanged renamings of the old Kodam IV, VI, VII,
VIII, XVI, and V. Kodam 1 amalgamated Kodam I, II, and III; Kodam 6, Kodam IX,
X, and XII; Kodam 7, Kodam XIII and XIV; and Kodam 8, Kodam XV and XVII.
What is curious, however, is that over the past two years no renumbering of Korem 
has taken place to  fit the new Kodam structure, indeed the numbering of some
new Korem has adapted to  the "old" pattern rather than the new.
It should be explained that in the "old days," and in accordance with the typical 
rationality o f. military command structures, the numbering of territorial units at
different levels was intended, and did, reflect hierarchies of jurisdiction and command. 
Thus, for example, if the Kodam of Central Java was assigned the number VII, its 
four constituent Korem would be numbered 071 through 074, and the th irty-five
lower-level Military District Commands (Kodim)— roughly corresponding to the kabu— 
patbn of the civilian administration— would be numbered 0701 through 0735. As things
now stand, however, Kodam 1 , based in Medan, has under it six Korem numbered
011, 012, 022, 023, 031, and 032 (and the Kodim follow the same pattern). Korem
O il and 012 were the two traditional Korem in Kodam I (Aceh), and the numbering 
reminds everyone of this. Korem 031 and 032, however, are new, products of the 
merger and repartitioning of the three Korem earlier composing the now—liquidated 
Kodam III (West Sumatra and Riau). Yet, they still bear the 03 numbering of Kodam
III, thus keeping the "West Sumatra" tradition alive and visible. The odd retention 
of the pre—reorganization regional codes has also affected South Sumatra and Java,
where no Kodam were eliminated in 1985, in that the 01, 02, and 03 series have been 
kept for the North Sumatra Korem, "forcing" Kodam 2 (S. Sumatra) to  stick with
the old Kodam IV’s 04 series, and Kodam 3 -5  to  retain the old Kodam VI—Vlll’s
06, 07, and 08 numberings. In Kodam 6 (Kalimantan), the Korem also underscore
their old origins: 091 corresponds territorially to  old Kodam IX  (East Kalimantan);
101 and 102, the combined Kodam X  (South and Central Kalimantan) developed when 
Kodam XI (Central Kalimantan) was eliminated on February 14, 1974; while 121 is
Kodam XII (West Kalimantan) in new guise. The numbering of Kodam 7 ’s five Korem 
(131 and 132; 141, 142, and 143) shows the residual visibility of the old Kodam
XIII (North Sulawesi) and XIV (South Sulawesi). A  final most interesting case is
Kodam 8, an amalgamation of old Kodam XV (Moluccas) and XVII (West Irian). For
this new Kodam, not only has Kodam XVII’s 17 numbering been retained for its
former Korem, but the liquidated Kodam XV has also been given (as Korem 174) a 
late number in the same series.
These anomalies suggest that General Murdani has felt it necessary to  proceed
cautiously with his territorial reorganization, and that he recognizes the continuing
strength of local sentiments and loyalties among the soldieiy (especially in the
Outer Islands). He is certainly fully aware that these sentiments helped break up
the territorial system of the 1950s (to which his new system bears so strong a 
resemblance). At the same time, there may be important long-term  implications in 
the retention of these anomalies. The reduction of, say, Kodam X III to  Korem 131 
means a reduction in the rank of its commander, from Brigadier-General to  Colonel. 
At the same time, the Governor of North Sulawesi (covering exactly the same area 
as Korem 131) is likely to  be a retired M ajor-General or even Lieutenant-General.
The Korem commander has to  report to  Jakarta via Kodam 7 ’s HQ in Makasar, while 
the governor answers directly to  the Minister of the Interior. Retention of the
1 3 -numbering serves to  remind the people of the region, including the soldiers in 
it, that in the very same ("ethnically" defined) territory, the local "military* leader­
ship is decisively lower in status than the "civilian" leadership, and that this structural
situation will persist even if Jakarta nominates a civilian to  the governorship. There 
are here the seeds of a quiet decline in the authority of the dwifungsi doctrine,
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which for so many years was reinforced by the layer—by—layer interlock between 
military and civilian territorial administrative jurisdictions and the status—subordina­
tion of the latter. (It was not so long ago that Kodam commanders had higher military 
ranks than the generals assigned as governors in the corresponding regional jurisdic­
tions.)
II. Politics o f the Changes
Any analysis of the political side of recent developments in the Indonesian 
military elite must necessarily focus on the pivotal figure of General Murdani. As
of December 31, 1987 (the cu t-o ff point for this article), he had served as Armed 
Forces’ Commander-in—Chief and as Kopkamtib Commander for almost 5 years (57
months) making him not only the highest officeholder in the Armed Services but
the active-duty officer with the longest tenure. In previous articles, emphasis was 
laid on the extraordinary concentration of power achieved by Murdani over these
years— partly the result of the institutional changes created by Law 20/1982, partly
of the reduction of all service chiefs to the status of "his1 staff officers, partly
of his long, iron grip on the state’s more effective intelligence bureaucracies, and 
partly of the active support of President Suharto. It was then argued that the reason 
for this concentration of power was that Suharto needed someone capable, determined, 
and trustworthy to  manage the generational transition in the Army, not least because 
the Army had always been the political guarantor of the New Order regime. This 
confidence appears to have been w ell-placed in that the transition, and the
accompanying structural reforms, have been carried out smoothly, and now seem 
firmly in place.
Yet there is one interesting exception, the Draft Law on the Military (RUU 
Keprajuritan), which was amply discussed at the October 2 1 -2 3 , 1967 Rapim ABRI 
(Armed Forces’ Leadership Annual Conference), with the likelihood that it would
be presented to  the Parliament (DPR) in December. The most significant feature 
of this bill is that it envisages raising the normal retirement age for ranking officers 
(colonel and above) from 55 to 60, a change justified on the grounds of customary
practice in the US and Thai militaries, and the greater physical fitness and longevity
of postrevolutionary Indonesians. What is very interesting is that the bill seems 
clearly not designed to  keep Murdani as Commander—in—Chief for another five years. 
For while the draft bill was being worked on in committee, Murdani is said to  have 
offered (in May) his resignation to the President in view of his soon reaching, on 
October 2, 1987, the 55-year limit on active duty status according to  the existing 
law. The President chose to  use the escape clause in the existing law to give Murdani 
an additional one-year extension of his active duty status. Since the Draft Law 
could have been presented at ariy time in the last three years (making Murdani’s
continued tenure unproblematic), it seems obvious that the President has decided 
that Murdani will be out of the Commander-m-Chiefship by some time next year.
What will happen then to  Murdani, and what to  the offices he holds and the
policies he secures? It may be helpful to  start with Murdani himself, before turning 
to  the question of Suharto’s own intentions.
At 55, Murdani is at the height of his powers in every sense. He has been an 
active player m military politics for over thirty years, starting from his junior
participation in the failed Zulkifli Lubis coup of 1955, through the crushing of the
Permesta rebellion in North Sulawesi in 1958, the campaign for West Irian in 1 9 6 1 -
1962 (when he was parachuted into Dutch-controUed territory), the murky maneuver- 
ings of 1964-1966  whereby the Suharto group came to  power in Jakarta and ended 
Confrontation with Malaysia, the first major intraregime crisis of the New Order
in Januaiy 1974 (Malari), the assault on East Timor (1975), up to the present. For
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most of this period he has been intimately associated with Suharto (who in many
ways has made his career).2 He has dominated Indonesia's militaiy intelligence 
apparatus since 1974 (and one key function of this system is the internal monitoring 
of loyalties within the Armed Forces). Finally, he has played a central role in Indo­
nesia’s foreign relations, including special missions to  Vietnam and China, as well 
as making policy on Papua New Guinea and East Tim or.3
Since 1983 he has husbanded his power jealously. The positions of Deputy Com­
mander—in—Chief and Deputy Commander of Kopkamtib have been abolished. It is widely 
believed that even after assuming the two top military jobs in March 1983, he refused
to give up4 direct control of ABRI Intelligence, and continues personalty to direct 
the shadowy activities of BAIS (Strategic Intelligence Agency). Since 1983 he has 
also taken an increasingly visible role in Indonesian domestic politics— outside the 
strictly military sphere. He is generally credited as masterminding the "mysterious
killings1 of 1983-1985 in which, if Amnesty International is correct, about 8,000  
petty criminals were extra legally executed mainly by military personnel in mufti. 
He took personal responsibility for the violent handling of the Tanjung Priok Affair
in September 1984. He has regularly and openly intervened in appointments to  gov­
ernorships, bupati-ships, memberships in national and provincial legislatures, and 
posts in important state agencies. It is clear that he made substantial contribu­
tions to the "opposition" PDI party in the April 23, 1987 elections, and he has visibly 
cultivated rural ulama and aristocratic politicians in Java and the Outer Islands, it 
has reached the point that many Indonesians speak of two major political factions 
in current political life, the "Murdani group" and the group of General Soedharmono,
who is currently head of the government's party Golkar, as well as Minister of
State (effectively the President's domestic chief of staff).
At 55, Murdani is ten years older than Suharto was when he seized power from  
Sukarno in 1965-1966. It is difficult to  imagine that he does not aspire to  becoming
President himself. Until he relinquishes his current offices he controls all the 
significant firepower in Indonesia; and he has been assigning key members of the 
"Timor group"— officers who worked closely with Mm on East Timor over the years—
to key positions in the present military hierarchy. If anyone could make a coup against
Suharto, it would be Murdani. A t the same time, he has to  think about the political 
liabilities of being a Catholic and of partty-European descent (how great a liability 
m fact these traits would be remains uncertain. Many powerful Third World militaiy 
leaders come from religious and/or ethnic minorities, e.g., Hafez a I—Assad, kU Amin,
Yakubu Gowon, etc.). Furthermore, he does not have much time left.
The problem is that once he ceases to  be Commander—in—Chief and Commander 
of Kopkamtib, any other job will mean a substantial loss in power. Perhaps only
the Vice—Presidency would have any attraction for him, but there is as yet no sign
that Suharto is planning anything along these lines.
How is Suharto himself likely to  be thinking about the future? W e may start
a tentative analysis by focusing on two questions: what are the implications of the
RUU Keprajuntan, and what is the character today of high-level army factionalism?
2. It is very rare anywhere for an officer to  be appointed Commander—in-C hief whose 
largest previous unit of command was a battalion.
3. He was Charge d’Affaires in Seoul from 1971 to  1974, at the height of the Park
Chung Hee militaiy dictatorship, and certainly learned a lot from the experience. 
He remains the most "Korean" of Indonesian officers.
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A  The RUU Keprajuritan
The obvious beneficiaries of the RUU Keprajuritan are the Military Academy
graduates of 1960—1963. Even if they privately believe that their professional capaci­
ties are greater than those of the Generation of ’45, they have rather little to
show the public to  demonstrate this superiority. The only major war in which they 
have been involved has been the tw elve-year counterinsurgency in East Timor, which 
continues at great cost in Indonesian and Timorese fives and resources, with little
prospect of victory in sight. Moreover, they have had to  wait for a long time to
become controllers of their country’s armed forces— not so much long by conven­
tional, international standards, as by comparison with their predecessors. Suharto
was Divisional Commander in Central Java at the age of 35; M ajor-General Setiyana,
who took over this same position at the beginning of 1987 was then 48; Suharto 
was Army Chief of Staff at 44, while General Try Sutrisno, who took up this post 
in June 1986, was then almost 51.
The RUU Keprajuritan should guarantee these officers almost a decade of active- 
service duty at the top (Sutrisno, among the oldest, is now 52). While the age-exten­
sion for active service will surely create dissatisfaction among graduates of p o st- 
1963 graduating Magelang classes, who could have hoped to  rise more quickly under 
the existing system, from Suharto’s point o f view the law should serve as an invaluable 
form of personal patronage as well as discouraging political ambitions among the 
AMN—generation army leaders. It will also leave to  members o f Suharto’s own Genera­
tion of '45 a monopoly of militarized positions in the state bureaucracy and state 
enterprises. From this perspective, the RUU Keprajuritan represents the final step 
in a well thought-out plan to  handle the transfer of real military power to  a group
of younger officers without close personal ties to  the President, with maximal smooth­
ness and minimal short— and long-term  risks to  the regime.
B. Factionalism
in the final part of the analysis presented in Issue no. 40, it was suggested 
that the pattern of personnel transfers seemed to indicate some tension between 
the interests of General Murdani and those of President Suharto. Do the changes 
of the past two years bear this analysis out? Possibly, but not necessarily. What 
is certain is that the changes have meant an increase in Murdani’s power in the 
capital city. The commander of Kodam Jaya (Metropolitan Jakarta), Major General 
Sugito, who came in directly from doubling as commander of Kostrad’s Airborne 
Combat Command and of the Operations Security Command in East Timor, is clearly 
a Murdani prot£g£. His new Chief of Staff, Brig. Gen. Arie Sadewo, came in from  
heading one of BAJS’s Directorates (H/W an— meaning?) where he would have worked 
very closely with Murdani). And the new Commander of Kostrad, Maj. Gen. Adolf 
Rajagukguk, has long been a Murdani instrument in East Timor. He was the first 
commander o f Korem 164/East Timor when it was set up on March 26, 1979, and 
later served as Commander of Kodam 9 (Lesser Sundas) which oversees East Timor’s 
military administration.4
There may also be something to  be learned from examining the timing of appoint­
ments over the past two years. Table A lists all appointments aside from those of 
Korem commanders and Kodam chiefs of staff; Table B covers this residual group.
4. He gained a certain international fame when Amnesty International published 
secret documents he had signed authorizing the use of torture against people suspected 
of Fretilin connections.
143
Table A Table B
1985 1986 1987 1985 1986 1987
October 1 0 0 0 2 3
November 0 1 1 1
December 1 1 5 1
January 2 9 2 3
February 1 0 3 2
March 5 0 3 2
April 10 0 0 0
May 2 0 3 1
June 2 4 2 2
July 1 1 1 3
August 0 7 1 4
September 1 1 0 1
B shows a pattern of steady change which suggests a system of routinized
turnovers, never more than five a month, and typically around two or three. There 
are only five months out of twenty—five where no changes at all occur. Table A,
on the other hand, shows very marked oscillations, with thick clusters in April 1986, 
Januaiy 1987, and August 1987. Especially notable is the heavy clustering of appoint­
ments (seventeen in M arch-M ay 1986) just prior to  Try Sutrisno’s becoming Army
Chief of Staff. K we further recall that his elevation took place about eight months 
later than it "should have” (i.e., his predecessor General Rudini was permitted to  
stay in the job for eight months «Hter he should have gone into retirement); that
the seventeen above appointments included most of the Assistants to  the Anny 
Chief of Staff (ie -, saddling T iy with a set of Assistants by no means certainly 
of his choosing);* and that six months had to elapse before a sizeable number of
new appointments were made— then we may be inclined to  think that Try’s position 
is much less strong than Murdani’s despite his being widely viewed as Suharto’s 
personal favorite among the New Generation of senior officers. In fact, rumor has 
it that there are two loose factions within the active-duty military elite, one com­
posed of "hard" East Timor veterans with strong ties to  Murdani, the other a "soft" 
clique nominally headed by T iy , and composed of "mainstream" professionals without 
conspicuous intelligence and counterinsurgency backgrounds. Yet even if these rumors 
have some basis in reality, it does not necessarily mean that Suharto has been
putting his weight forcibly behind one and against the other. It may suit his book
to keep them in rough competitive balance.
But this tactic will not solve the problems of what to  do about Murdani, and 
what to  do about the offices he now holds. The present concentration of power in 
Murdani’s hands is the result of a particular crisis-specific set of needs, talents,
and opportunities, and is unlikely to  be maintained after Murdani’s departure. One 
possible solution would be to  put command of the Armed Forces and of Kopkamtib 
in separate hands, as more or less happened in the days of Generals Panggabean 
and Sumitro. It is not clear that the Kopkamtib Commander has to  be an officer
on active service, so perhaps Murdani could retain this office after retirement,
especially if the egregious Yoga Sugama, nominal head of Bakin for the past thirteen
years, were to  yield his post to  Murdani. Another alternative, the rebuilding of 
the Ministry of Defense under Murdani’s leadership, seems less likely. Law 20/1982 
is firmly in place, and a major institutional upheaval would be required to  create 5
5. Usually an incoming official of this rank is expected to  have the freedom to  
pick Ns own staff right away.
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a Defense Minister more powerful than the Commander-in-Chief; and it would be
an upheaval very difficult to justify in terms of present needs or current army
doctrine. Only if the Minister were concurrently Kopkamtib Commander would the
appointment be minimally attractive. Still another alternative for Suharto is to  name
Murdani his Vice-President in March 1988, easing him out of real power, but compen­
sating for the! by naming him as his successor. But for twenty years Suharto has
been very careful to  avoid appointing a Vice-President who could plausibly succeed 
him (he clearly intends to be, in fact, if not in name, president for life), and it 
seems unlikely that he will change his style at this stage. Yet it is also uncertain
whether Suharto really trusts the Military Academy types sufficiently to  be able 
to dispense with Murdani’s capacities and knowledge; no one in Indonesia knows 
where more bodies, physical and figurative, are buried than he.
In any case, the decisions will be coming very soon now. In line with past 
practice Suharto will announce his Vice-President in March, and a cabinet reshuffle
will certainly be carried out around the same time. W e shall then have a much 
clearer picture of Murdani’s future and of the way power within the military is
going to  be allocated, formally and informally, over the coming five years.
* * *
April 1, 1988 
Postscript
Since the above analysis was completed, a series of important transfers has 
begun, which will probably continue throughout the rest of 1988. It is not possible 
yet to offer a confident interpretation, so that these concluding notes are necessarily
speculative.
The chain of events opened on February 10, when, after a private meeting
with the President, General Murdani told the press that he was being retired from  
active duty and would promptly be replaced by Army Chief of Staff General T iy  
Sutrisno. The transfer duly took place on February 29, preceded on February 23 
by Edy Sudradjat becoming Army Chief of Staff. Sudradjat was then succeeded in 
early March as Deputy Chief of Staff by Adolf Sahala Rajagukguk, the Kostrad 
Commander, who was replaced on March 15 as Kostrad Commander by Sugito, Com­
mander of Kodam Jaya. The previous day Sugito himself had been replaced as Jaya 
Commander by Diponegoro Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Suryadi Sudirdja.
It was widely noticed that on leaving the Commander—in-Chiefship Murdani 
did not give up the other key post he held, that of Kopkamtib Commander. As of 
this writing it is still unclear what the future of Kopkamtib will be and whether
Murdani will continue to  control it. A  number of highly placed officials have said 
publicly tin t Kopkamtib’s mission is to  be thoroughly revamped, with more emphasis 
being laid on securing economic stability and security. It has only been made plain 
that whoever eventuaHy heads it, or its successor, that person will not be the new
Armed Forces Commander—in—Chief.
In the meantime, at the MPR meeting on March 11, Lt. Gen. Sudharmono, State 
Secretaiy and General Chairman of Golkar, emerged as Suharto’s chosen candidate
for Vice-President. This candidacy was the first in the history of the New Order
to arouse visible antagonism, most evidently from the military. An obscure B rigadier- 
General (Ibrahim Saleh), a member of the Armed Forces’ fraksi in the MPR, startled 
the session by springing to  the speaker’s podium to  protest the President’s selection.
John Naro, the slippery head of the Muslim PPP party, put forward his own candidacy, 
purportedly with some military backing. Moreover, the Armed Forces’ fraksi ostenta­
tiously refrained from cosponsoring Sudharmono. But in fairly short order these
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murmurs of dissent were silenced. Naro withdrew his candidacy, and the military 
fraksi in the end joined the unanimous approval of the President’s choice. Two 
weeks later, the new Cabinet was announced, and the questions about Murdani’s 
future as a retired officer were partly settled by his nomination as Minister of
Defense and Security replacing General Poniman.
It is difficult not to  read this series of curiosities as— at least in part— a political
struggle between the Palace and Armed Forces’ Headquarters. The most plausible 
explanation of Murdani’s abrupt removal as Com m ander-in-Chief a bare month before 
the MPR session is that Suharto had already privately decided not to make Murdani 
his Vice-President and potential legal successor, and thought it prudent to remove 
him from command of troops before breaking the disagreeable news. If one looks 
at the promotions and transfers that followed in late Februaiy and early March, 
most of the beneficiaries are thought to  be Murdani men— generals with RPKAD 
backgrounds, deep involvement in East Timor, and significant intelligence ties. (In
other words their careers look very different from Try Sutrisno’s.) It is also worth 
noting that, on Januaiy 15, Rear Admiral Soedibyo Rahardjo was installed as the 
new Chief of the General Staff (the no. 2 position in Armed Forces’ Headquarters) 
replacing Lt.-G en. Ida Bagus Sudjana. The admiral is a former BAIS man and long­
time intelligence aide to  Murdani. If this line of speculation is correct, it suggests
that Murdani has been trying to remain a powerful force and policy-determiner in
Armed Forces’ Headquarters, even after he has lost the Commander—in—Chiefship. 
His retention, for the time being, of the Kopkamtib command, points in the same 
direction.
On paper, Murdani’s appointment as Defense Minister is an honorable promotion, 
one that it would be difficult to  complain about in public. But the fact is that, as
a result of Law 20/1982, in the drafting of which Murdani had a major hand, the 
Defense Ministry is a pale shadow of what it was in the days of Generals Nasu—
tion, Suharto, Panggabean, and Yusuf. As detailed in an earlier analysis (see Indo­
nesia, No. 37 (April 1984)), its functions are routine-administrative and it has no
institutional extensions in the provinces. During his five years as Defense Minister
General Poniman was a largely invisible figure. If we add that, at least formally, 
the Defense Minister does not answer directly to  the President but is supposed to  
go through the Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security, Suharto faithful 
Admiral Sudomo, it looks as though Murdani has for the time being lost a good 
deal of power. If, as is likely given his character, he now attempts to  reinvent 
the Defense Ministry, it will be hard not to  set the Com m ander-in-Chief and the
Minister on an antagonistic course— which may, of course, suit the President’s book. 
The key things to  watch in the coming months will be: (1) whether Murdani manages 
to keep control of Kopkamtib, and of the labyrinthine intelligence networks that
he has dominated since 1974; and (2) whether Try Sutrisno proves able to  create 
his own group m Armed Forces’ Headquarters, and free himself wholly or partially 
from the appointees of his predecessor.
*  *  ♦
The format approximates that used in the previous listing Indonesia, No. 40 
(October 1985)) and is for the period ending December 31, 1987. (Additional material 
on the regional leaderships at the Kodam and Korem levels will be included in Issue 
46 (October 1988).) A  glossary of some of the most used abbreviations follows. There 
is, finally, a list of the members of the Fifth Development Cabinet announced by 
President Suharto on March 21 after the closing of the 1988 MPR session.
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ARMED FORCES HEADQUARTERS (Mabes ABRI)
I. Commander—in—Chief
Commander—in—Chief of the Armed Forces
Gen. Leonardos Benjamin ("Benny") 
Murdani
(b. October 2, 1932, Cepu) (P3AD)
Commander of Kopkamtib 
Gen. Leonardus Benjamin Murdani
28.iii.83 (57 months)
Gen. Andi Mohammad Yusuf 
Assistant for Security, Hankam; Head, 
Strategic intelligence Center; Deputy 
Head, Bakin
RPKAD J
28.iii.83 (57 months)
Admiral R. Sudomo 
As above
RPKAD J
II. Staff Echelon
Chief of the General Staff (Kasum)
1. Vice-M arshal Oetomo 
(b. April 15, 1935, Malang)
2. Lt. Gen. Dading Kalbuadi 
(b. April 14, 1931, Cilacap) 
(P3AD)
3. Lt. Gen. Ida Bagus Sudjana6 
(b. June 5, 1937, Bali)
(AMN 1, 1960)
c. 10.xi.84—18.iv.86 (17 months)
Lt. Gen. R. Himawan Sutanto 
Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force
Air Force J
18.iv.86-5.i.87 (81/2 months)
Assistant for Logistics to  the C -'m -C  
Armed Forces; Head, Armed Forces’ 
Supply Body (Babek)
RPKAD J
5.i.87-10.x.87 (10 months)
Assistant for Social and Political 
Affairs to  the C—in—C Armed Forces
7 Balinese
Chief of the Social and Political Staff (KassospoQ
1. Lt. Gen. Bambang Triantoro 
(b. Januaiy 7, 1931, Surabaya)
2  Lt. Gen. Soegiarto
(b. June 2, 1936, Karanganyar, 
Kebumen) (AMN 1, 1960)
21 .vm.85—5.i.87 (16!/2 months)
Lt. Gen. Gunawan Wibisono (deceased) 
Deputy Army Chief of Staff 
Ordnance J
5.i.87 (12 months)
Assistant for Personnel to  the Army 
Chief of S taff
D J
6. On October 10, 1987 Sudjana replaced Lt. Gen. Yogi Supardi as Secretary-General, 
Department of Defense. No successor had been named as of December 31.
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Inspector—General (Irjen ABRI)
1. Air Vice-M arshal Iskandar
2. Rear Adm. Gatot Suwardi 
(b. January 21, 1935, Jember)
Assistant for General Planning (Asrenum)
1. Vice Adm. F. Parapat
2. Air Vice—Marshal Tedy Roesdi 
Hayuni
Assistant for Security (Intelligence] (Aspam)
1. Maj. Gen. M. I. Sutaiyo8 
(P3AD)
2. Maj. Gen. Soedibyo9
Assistant for Operations (Asops)
1. Maj. Gen. Edy Sudradjat 
(b. April 22, 1938, Jambi)
(AMN 1, 1960)
2. Rear Adm. Soedibyo Rahardjo
c. iii.1984—31.V.86 (c. 26 months)
U . Gen. Gunawan Wibisono (deceased)
?
Air Force J
31.V.86 (19 months)
Commander of the Fleet, Eastern Zone 
Navy J
? (1980)-?  (1986)7
Maj. Gen. Ignatius Yogi Supardi
?
Navy Toba Batak
? 1986
A Director in BAIS
? ?
? 1983—?
Maj. Gen. Soelarso
?
? ?
?
?
? ?
c. 30.iv.85-16.vi.86 (13l/2 months) 
First Air Marshal Ibnu Subroto 
Commander Kodam VI (3)
SI J
c. vi.86 (c. 18 months)
Head, External Affairs Directorate of 
BAIS (1984)
? ?
7. He was concurrently Director-General of Budget and General Planning in the 
Defense and Security Department in March 1986.
8. In November 1986 he was also reported to be Deputy Head of BAIS. (AS November 
26, 1986.)
9. I have been unable to  find any information on Maj. Gen. Soedibyo and it is 
likely he too served in BAIS.
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Assistant for Territorial Affairs (Aster)
1. Maj. Gen. Sarwono10 
(b. 1332)
2. Maj. Gen. Sutahan M.
c. 15.v.85-?.viii.86 (c. 15 months) 
Maj. Gen. Eddy Marzuki Nalapraya 
Chief of Staff, Kodam 4 
SI? J
?.viii.86 (16 months)
?
? ?
Assistant for Communications and Electronics (Askomlek)
Air Vice—Marshal Soebagyo ? xi.1984 (38 months)
Vice-M arshal Tedjo Suwamo
?
Aar Force J
Assistant for Security and Social Order (Askamtibmas)
Police Maj. Gen. Drs. Achmad Djuaeni11
Assistant for Personnel (Aspens)
1. Maj. Gen. Soegiaito
2. First Marshal Soedarma
Assistant for Logistics (Aslog)
1. Lt. Gen. Dading Kalbuadi
2. Rear Admiral Emir Hamzah 
Mangaweang
3. Rear Admiral A. Rahadi
c. 20.vii.85-? (29 months)
Police Maj. Gen. Drs. Poerwata 
Chief of Police, N. Sumatra 
Police J?
c. 30.iv.85-c. l.i.8 7  (20 months) 
Maj. Gen. Suharto Partoatmodjo 
Commander, Kodam VII (4)
D  J
c. l.i.8 7  (12 months)
(probably) Director, Personnel and 
Placement, Air Force 
Air Force J?
c. ii.l9 8 3 -c . 18.iv.86 (38 months)
Lt. Gen. Supardjo 
Commander, Kodam XVI 
RPKAD J
c. 30.iv.86-?? (?)
Head, Armed Forces’ Information Center 
Navy Buginese
?  (?)
?
Navy ?
10. Reportedly he became Secretary-General of the Social Affairs Ministry in about 
August 1986.
11. AB  reports that on June 20, 1986 he was also made Deputy for Administration 
to the Head of National Police. It is not clear how long he kept his old job.
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Assistant for Finance (Asku)
Lt. Gen. Widyo Sarwono12 6 .ix.75-?
Maj. Gen. Suhanto
Officer seconded to  the Army Chief of Staff 
Finance Corps J
Assistant for Social and Political Affairs (Assospol)
1. Maj. Gen. Goenarso S.F.
2. Maj. Gen. Ida Bagus Sudjana
3. Maj. Gen. Harsudiyono Hartas 
(b. June 4, 1935, Jepara)
(AMN 1, 1960)
Assistant for Functional Group Affairs (Asyawan)
1. Maj. Gen. Roestandi A. Moestafa 
(b. July 20, 1933, Bandung)
(Akad Zeni, 1956)
Head, Armed Forces’ Financial Center
1. Col. Rachmansyah
2. Col. Dts. H. F. Putong
3. Navy Lt. Col. M. Sudjana B.Sc.
4 .iii.80-c . 30.X.85 (c. 68 months)
(retired November 1985)
Brig. Gen. Prapto Praj'rtno
Head, Armed Forces’ Information Center
B J
c. 30.x.85-5.i.87 (14 months)
Assistant for Territorial Affairs to  
the Army Chief of Staff 
? Balinese
5.L87 (12 months)
Commander, Kodam 4  
Cavalry J
c. 9.viii.85 (281/ 2 months)
Maj. Gen. ChaNmi Imam Santoso 
Commander, Kodam 2 
Engineers S
c. 23.iB.85-?
?
Finance Corps J?
?-23.ix.86
?
Finance Corps ?
23.ix.86 (15 months)
Head, Sub Dinas Pembiayaan 
(Sub Service for Expenditures ??] 
Armed Forces’ Financial Center 
Navy J?
Central Executive Organs (Lakpus)
1. Governor, National Defense Institute (Lemharmas)
Maj. Gen. Soebijakto Prawirosoebroto 31.V.83 (49 months)
(b. August 17, 1929, Wates) [retired November 1985)
(Breda) Lt. Gen. Sutopo Yuwono
Officer seconded to the C—in—C 
B J
1 2  It is almost certain that Gen. Sarwono has retired, but I have been unable to  
find any note of a successor.
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2. Commander—General, Armed Forces Academy (Akabri)
1. U . Gen. (Marines) Kahpi 
Suriadiredja
(b. June 14, 1931, Bandung)
2. Rear Adm. Soegiatmo
21.ii.85-15.xi.86 (21 months)
Lt. Gen. Murgito 
Commander, Kowilhan IV 
Marines S
15.xi.86 (13V2 months)
Governor, Naval Academy 
Navy J
3. Commander-General, Armed Forces’ Staff and Command School (Sesko ABRI)
1. Maj. Gen. Drs. Sumargono 
Kartoprajitno
23.vi.84-12.iv.86 (21]/2 months) 
[retired November 1986) 
Vice-M arshal Aried Riyadi
?
? J
2. Maj. Gen. Sukarto 12.iv.86 (20}/2 months)
(b. c. 1937) (AMN 1, 1960) Assistant for Research and Development
to  the Army Chief of Staff 
Cavalry J
4. Head, Armed Forces’ Mental Upbuilding Center (Pusbintal)
1. Rear Adm. Dr. Tarmizi Thaher 1982-c . 30.viii.87 (c. 60 months)
(b. Padang, 1936) Brig. Gen. M. Soegeng Widjaja
7
Navy Minangkabau
2. Col. H. N. Nurdin 30.viii.87 (4 months)
Head, Army Mental Upbuilding Seivice 
Engineers ?
5. Head, Research and Development Center (Puslitbang)
1. Brig. Gen. Drs. Ngandani, M.Sc. c. 4 .v i.83 -l.x ii.86  (c. 42 months)
Maj. Gen. Theo Sumantri
?
? J
2. Col. Lukman R. Boer l.x ii.86 (13 months)
Deputy Head, Center for Research and 
Development, Armed Forces’ Headquarters 
Engineers ?
6. Head, Armed Forces’ Center of History and Tradition (Pusjarah)
Brig. Gen. Gatot Surjadi13 ? 1 9 8 2 -l.x i.8 6  (7)
Brig. Gen. (Titular) Dr. Nugroho 
Notosusanto (deceased)
?
SI J
13. Gatot Surjadi retired in November 1986 and no note has been found of his 
successor. In October 1987 the deputy head of Pusjarah was Col. (Cav.) Soeparmo. 
(AB October 20, 1987.)
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1. Maj. Gen. Dr. Kumia Natadisastra c. 2.vi.79—c. l.v ii.87 (97 months)
[retired November 1985)
Brig. Gen. Dr. Abdullah Hassan
?
Medical Corps S
7. Head, Armed Forces’ Medical Center (Puskes)
2. Brig. Gen. P. Pasaribu c. l.vii.87 (6 months)
?
? Toba Batak
8. Head, Armed Forces’ Military Police Center (Puspom)
1. Brig. Gen. R. Sardjono c. late Feb. 85—15.vi.87 (c. 28
months)
Brig. Gen. Gatot Matrai 
Head, President’s Security Squad 
(Paswalpres)
Military Police J
2. Brig. Gen. Hadi Baroto 15.vi.87 (6V 2 months)
?
Military Police J?
9. Head, Armed Forces’ Information Center (Puspen)
1 . Rear Adm. Emir Hamzah 
Mangaweang
2. Brig. Gen. Pieter Damanik 
(b. October 18, 1934, 
Pematang Siantar)
17.vi.83-24.iv.86 (34 months)
Brig. Gen. Drs. Encung A.S.
?
Navy Buginese
24.iv.86-16.x.87 (18 months)14 
?
? Simalungun Batak
10. Armed Forces’ Survey and Mapping Center (Pussurta)
1. Brig. Gen. Utaiyo Surodirono 8.xi.83-8.iv.86 (29 months)
Vice Adm. D. U. Martojo
?
Army Topography Corps J
2. First Admiral Sri Waskito 8.iv.86 (21 months)
(b. February 21, 1937, Solo) Head, Navy Hydro—Oceanographic Service
(AAL 1959) Navy J
11. Head, Armed Forces’ Legal Upbuilding Body (Babinkum)
Maj. Gen. M. Djaelani SH ? (certainly by 1984)
?
?
? ?
14. Damanik was appointed to a position in the foreign office on October 16, 1987, 
but I have found no report of his successor. {AB, October 17, 1987.)
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12. Head, Armed Forces’ Supply Body (Babek)
1. Maj. Gen. Dading Kalbuadi c. March 8 3 -c . April 86 (37 monlhs)
Maj. Gen. M. R. Sunardjo 
Commander, Kodam XVI 
RPKAD J
2. Col. Soemartono c. April 86 (?) (20 monlhs?)
?
Cavalry J
13. Head, Armed Forces’ Functional Group Upbuilding Body (Babinkar)
Maj. Gen. Roestandi A  Moestafa c. 15.vii.85 (29‘/2 months)
Maj. Gen. Chalimi Imam Santoso 
Commander, Kodam 2 
Engineers S
14. Commander, National Air Defense Command (Kohanudnas)
1. Vice—Marshal Hartono c. 8.vi«.84—ll.v i.8 7  (34 months)
Air Vice-M arshal Iskandar
?
Air Force J
2. First Air Marshal Ateng Suarsono ll.v i.8 7  (6!/2 months)
Commander, Koharmat AU (Air Force 
Maintenance and Supply Command 
[Pemeliharaan dan Pembekalan AU] 
Air Force J
SERVICE HEADS AND ARMY HIERARCHY
Commander—in-Chief of the Armed Forces
Gen. Leonardus Benjamin ("Benny") 
Murdani
Army Chief of Staff 
1. Gen. Rudini
(b. December 15, 1929, Malang) 
(Breda)
2  Gen. Try Sutrisno
(b. November 15, 1935, Surabaya) 
(Aktekad 4, 1959)
Navy Chief of Staff
1. Adm. Mohammad Romly 
(b. December 8, 1928,
Tubing Agung)
28.iii.83 (57 months)
Gen. Andi Mohammad Yusuf 
Assistant for Security, Dept, of 
Defense and Security; Head, 
Strategic Intelligence Center; 
Deputy Head, Bakin 
RPKAD J
7 .iii.83—24.vi.86 (391/? months) 
Gen. S. Poniman 
Commander, Kostrad 
D J
24.vi.86 (18 months)
Deputy Army Chief of Staff 
Engineers J
4jtii.82-17.iv .86 (40 months)
Adm. Walujo Sugito 
Chief of Operations Staff, Dept, of 
Defense and Security 
Navy J
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2. Admiral Rudolf Kasenda 
(b. May 15, 1934, Rantepao)
Air Force Chief of Staff
1. Air Marshal Sukardi
(b. December 1931, Bojonegoro)
2. Air Marshal Oetomo
Chief of the National Police
1. Police Gen. Anton Sudjarwo 
(b. September 21, 1930, 
Bandung) (Brimob)
2. Police Gen. Drs. Moch. Sanoesi 
(b. 1935, Bogor)
Commander of the Marine Corps
1. Maj. Gen. (Marines) Muntaram 
(b. c. 1933-34 , Cianjur)
2. Brig. Gen. (Marines) Aminullah 
Ibrahim (b. 1937, Banyuwangi)
Deputy Army Chief of Staff
1. Lt. Gen. T iy  Sutrisno
(b. November 15, 1935, Surabaya) 
(Aktekad 4, 1959)
2. Lt. Gen. Edy Sudradjat
First Assistant (Intelligence)
Maj. Gen. I Gde Awet Sara 
(b. March 3, 1936, Bali) 
(Aktekad 4, 1959)
17.kr.86 (201/2 months)
Deputy for Logistics, Armed Forces’ 
C -in -C
Navy Torajan
4.xii.82—17.kr.86 (40 months)
Air Marshal Ashadi Tjahjadi 
Commander, Kostranas [now abolished 
National Strategic Command)
Air Force J
17.kr.86 (20*/2 months)
Chief of the General Staff, Armed 
Forces’ Headquarters 
Air Force J
4.xii.82-3.vii.86 (44 months)
Police Lt. Gen. Dr. Awaloedin Djamin
Chief of Police, Jakarta
Police J
3.vii.86 (18 months)
Chief of Police, Central Java 
Police J? S?
7.V.83—7.i.87 (44 months)
Lt. Gen. (Marines) Kahpi Suriadiredja 
Chief of Staff, Marine Corps 
Marines S
7.i.87 (12 months)
Chief of Staff, Marine Corps
Marines J? Madurese?
21.viii.8S-16.vi.86 (10 months) 
Lt. Gen. Bambang Triantoro 
Commander, Kodam V  (10) 
Engineers J
16.vi.86 ( I 8V 2 months)
Assistant for Operations, Armed 
Forces’ C -in -C
SI J
26.vi.85 (30 months)
Maj. Gen. Ari Bandiyoko (deceased)
Commander, Kodam IX
Engineers Balinese
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Second Assistant (Operations)
1. Maj. Gen. Adolf Sahala Rajagukguk 
(b. December 31, 1338, Medan) 
(AMN 2, 1961)
2  Maj. Gen. Zein Maulani
Third Assistant (Personnel)
1. Maj. Gen. Syaukat Banjaransari15 
(b. c. 1937) (AMN 1, 1960)
2. M aj. Gen. Soetopo
26.vi.85-c. mid—March 86 (8V2 months) 
Maj. Gen. Prajitno 
Commander, Kodam XIII 
D Toba Batak
c. m id-M arch 86 (21!/2 months)
Deputy Assistant for Operations (Waas 
Ops) to  the Army Chief of Staff 
? Buginese?
26.vi.85-c. February 86 (8 months) 
Maj. Gen. Sudiman Saleh 
Chief of Staff, Kostrad
? J
c. February 86 (c. 22 months)
Deputy Assistant for Personnel to  the 
Army Chief of Staff
? ?
Fourth Assistant (Logistics)
1. Maj. Gen. Ishak Odang 23.v.83-?.vi.85 (c. 24 months)
Li. Gen. Haroen Soewardi 
Head, Army General Supply Sendee 
? S?
2  Maj. Gen. Sugeng Subroto 
(b. Surabaya) (AMN 1, 1960)
?.vi.85-4.viii.87 (c. 26 months) 
Chief of Staff, Kodam 10  
B? J?
3. Maj. Gen. Soedarto 4.viii.87 (5 months)
?
Engineers J?
Fifth Assistant (Research and Development/Planning and Budgeting)
1. Maj. Gen. Sukarto
2. Brig. Gen. Tiopan Bernhard 
Silalahi
(b. 1940) (AMN 2, 1961) 
Assistant for Territorial Affairs
26.vi.85-c. 12.iv.86 (81/2 months)
Maj. Gen. Darsoyo 
Deputy Governor, General and Army 
Division, Armed Forces’ Academy 
Cavaliy J
c. m id-M arch 1986 (20]/2 months)
Chief of Staff, Kodam 4 
D Toba Batak
1. Maj. Gen. Ida Bagus Sudjana 9.X.84-30.X.85 (14V2 months)
Brig. Gen. Harjono Prawirodirdjo (deceased) 
Commander, Kodam X II 
? Balinese
15. Syaukat Banjaransari then became Military Secretary to the President, replacing 
(14.ii.86) retired Air Vice-M arshal Kardono.
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2. Maj. Gen. B. P. Makadada 30.X.85 (26 months)
Chief of Staff, Kowilhan IV
Hasanudin? Menadonese
Commander, Army Strategic Reserve (Kostrad)
1. Lt. Gen. Soeweno
(b. c. 1929, Madiun) (P3AD)
2. Maj. Gen. Soeripto
(b. November 18, 1934, 
Temanggung) (AMN 1, 1960)
3. Maj. Gen. Adolf Sahala Rajagukguk
24.V.83—30.L86 (32 months) (retired 
November 1986)
Lt. Gen. Rudini
Second Assistant (Operations) to the 
Army Chief of Staff 
RPKAD J
30. i. 86—21.viii. 87 (19 months)
Commander, Kodam 1 
D J
21.vm.87 (4 months)
Commander, Kodam 9 
D Toba Batak
Governor, General and Army Division, Armed Forces’ Academy
1. Maj. Gen. Untung Sridadi 
Tjokrowidjojo (Breda)
c. 6.vi.83—8.iii.86 (33 months)
November 1986)
Maj. Gen. Sudiman Saleh 
Army Inspector-General 
D J
[retired
2. Maj. Gen. Hasudungan Simandjuntak 
(b. 1936) (AMN 1, 1960)
3. Brig. Gen. Toni Hartono 
(AMN 2, 1961)
8.i8.86—c. l.ix .87  (18 months)
Commander, Kodam 8
Infantry Toba Batak
c. l.ix .87  (4 months)
Deputy Governor of General and Army 
Division, Armed Forces’ Academy 
? ?
Commander, Army Staff and Command School (Seskoad)
1. Maj. Gen. Theo Sumantri 4.vi.83-27.v.86 (36 months)
(Breda) Maj. Gen. Bagus Sumitro
Head, Research and Development Center, 
Armed Forces’ Headquarters 
Signal Corps J
2. Maj. Gen. Damuanto 27.V.86 (19 months)
Deputy Commander, Army Staff and 
Command School 
? J
Commander, Kopassus (Special Forces Command)
1. Brig. Gen. Sintong Pandjaitan 
(b. September 4, 1941, Tarutung)
(AMN 4, 1963)
2. Brig. Gen. Kuntara
22.V.85—8.viii.87 (26*/2 months)
Brig. Gen. Wismoyo Aris Munandar 
Commander, Airborne and Secret W ar 
Training Center [Pussandha Linud) of 
Kopassus
RPKAD Toba Batak
8.vMi.87 (5 months)
Deputy Commander, Kopassus 
RPKAD J?
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REGIONAL MILITARY LEADERS
KODAM (Military Region Command) 1 
BUWT BARISAN (North Sumatra)
KODAM Commander
1. Maj. Gen. Soeripto 27.iv.85-28.i.86 (9 months)
2. Maj. Gen. Djarot Supadmo
3. Maj. Gen. Ali Geno17
(b. September 20, 1936, Cirebon) 
(AMN 1, 1960)
4. Brig. Gen. Asmono Arismunandar
(b. c. 1938, Ponorogo)
(AMN 2, 1961)
Commander Kodam III 
D J
28.i.86—28.ii.86 (1 month)16
23.iv.86—6.vi.87 (13!/2 months) 
Chief of Staff, Kodam I 
Engineers
6.vi.87 (7 months)
Chief of Staff, Kodam 5 
B?
Cirebonese
J
KODAM 2
SRIWIJAYA (South Sumatra) 
1. Maj. Gen. Siswadi
2. Maj. Gen. R. Soenardi
(b. December 31, 1937, Yogya) 
(AMN 2, 1961)
Panglima
23. v.85-24.viii.87 (27 months)
Maj. Gen. Roestandi A. Moestafa 
Director, Social &  Political Doctrine
Development, Armed Forces’ Staff and 
Command College 
Engineers/D J
24. viii.87 (4 months)
Chief of Staff, Kodam 2 
Cavalry J
KODAM 3
SILIWANGI (West Java)
Maj. Gen. Raja Inal Siregar 
(b. c. 1938)
(AMN 2, 1961)
Panglima
18.V.85 (291/2 m onths)
Maj. Gen. Edy Sudrajat 
Commander Kodam XIII 
SI Sipirok Batak
16. Supadmo was killed in a helicopter crash on this date.
17. Newspaper accounts suggest that Ali Geno was abruptly removed because of openly 
criminal behavior by some of his subordinates.
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KODAM 4
DIPONEGORO (Central Java)
1. Maj. Gen. Harsudiyono Hartas
2. Maj. Gen. Setiyana
(b. February 12, 1939, Solo) 
(AMN 2, 1961)
BRAWUAYA (East Java)
1. Maj. Gen. Saiful Sulun
(b. January 6, 1937, Medan) 
(AMN 1, 1960)
2. Maj. Gen. Sugeng Subroto
(b. Surabaya)
(AMN 1, 1960)
TANJUNGPURA (Kalimantan)
Maj. Gen. Faisal Tanjung 
(AMN 2, 1961)
WIRABUANA (Sulawesi)
Maj. Gen. Nana Narundana
(b. c. 1937, Tasikmalaya) 
(AMN 1, 1960)
Panglhna
18.V.85—12187 (20 months)
Maj. Gen. Soegiarto 
Commander, Kodam II 
Cavalry J
12187 ( l l x/2 months) 
Commander, Kodam 8 
? J
KODAM 5
Panglima
14.v.85-U .v iii.87  (27 months)
Maj. Gen. Soelarso18
Artillery Minangkabau
ll.v iii.8 7  (4*/2 months)
Assistant for Logistics to the Kostrad 
Chief of Staff
B? J
KODAM 6
Panglima
2.V.85 (32 months)
Commander, Infantry Weapons Center 
RPKAD Mandating Batak
KODAM 7
Panglima
c. 14.V.85 (31V2 months)
Commander, Kodam I 
Cavaliy S
18. Maj. Gen. Soelarso became Director-General of Army Headquarters.
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KODAM 8
CENDRAWASIH (Irian Barat St Maluku)
Panglima
1. Maj. Gen. Hasudungan Simanjuntak 8.v.85—13.iii.86 (10 months)
2. Brig. Gen. Setiyana
3. Maj. Gen. Wismoyo Arismunandar 
(b. Februaiy 2, 1940)
(AMN 4, 1963)
Commander, Kodam XV
Infantry Toba Batak
13.iii.86—9.i.87 (10 months)
Chief of Staff, Kodam X lll,5>
? J
9187  (12 months)
Chief of Staff, Kodam 9 
RPKAD J
KODAM 9
UDAYANA (Nusatenggara)
1. Maj. Gen. R. P. D. Soetarto
(P3AD)
2. Maj. Gen. Adolf Sahala Rajaguguk
3. Brig. Gen. Djoko Pramono
Panglima
9. iv. 85—6. iii. 86 (11 months)
Commander Kodam XVI 
SI J
6. iii. 86—12.viii. 87 (17 months)
Assistant for Operations to the Army 
Chief of StafT
D Toba Batak
12.viii.87 (41/2 months)
Commander, Artillery Weapons Center 
Artilleiy J
KODAM JAYA
JAYA (Greater Jakarta)
Maj. Gen. Sugito
(b. c. 1939, Yogya) 
(AMN 2, 1961)
Panglima
9.viii.85 (29 months)
Maj. Gen. Tty Sutrisno 
Commander, Airborne Combat Command, 
Kostrad; Commander, Security Operations 
Command, East Timor 
RPKAD J
* * *
19. After graduating from the Military Academy, he had Zl/ 2 years in Ceram—Maluku, 
then was a Battalion Commander in Padang; then served 3*/2 years in the Embassy 
in Vientiane; then to Kostrad before going to Kodam XIII in 1985.
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Head State Intelligence Coordination Board (Bakin)
Gen. Yoga Sugama 
(b. May 12, 1925, Tegal) 
(Rikugun Shikan Gakko 
(Japanese Military Academy])
28174 (167 months)
Lt. Gen. Sutopo Yuwono 
Deputy Ambassador to  the UN 
D J
Commander, Presidential Security Squad (Paswalpres)
Brig. Gen. Pranowo 30.i.85 (85 months)
Brig. Gen. R. Sardjono 
Commander, Military Police, Kodam V  
Military Police J
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Abbreviations
ABRI Angkatan Bersenjata Republik 
Indonesia
Armed Forces of the Republic 
of Indonesia
Akabri Akademi Angkatan Bersenjata Indonesian Armed Forces’ 
Academy
Akad Zeni Akademi Zeni Engineers’ Academy
Aktekad Akademi Teknik Angkatan 
Darat
Army Technical Academy
AMN Akademi Militer Nasional National Military Academy
B Brawijaya
BAIS Badan Intelijen Strategis Strategic Intelligence Agency
Bakin Badan Koordinasi Intelijen 
Negara
State Intelligence Coordinating 
Agency
BB Bukit Barisan
D Oiponegoro
J Javanese
Kodam Komando Daerah Militer Military Area Command
Kodim Komando Distrik Militer Military District Command
Kopassus Komando Pasukan Khusus Special Forces’ Command
Kopkamtib Komando Pemulihan Keamanan 
dan Ketertiban
Command for the Restoration 
of Security and Public Order
Korem Komando Resort Militer Military Resort Command
Kostrad Komando Strategis Angkatan 
Darat
Army Strategic Command
Kowilhan Komando Wilayah Pertahanan Defense Region Command
KSAD (Kasad) Kepala Staf Angkatan Darat Army Chief of Staff
Paswalpres Pasukan Pengawal Presiden Presidential Security Squad
P3AD Pusat Pendidikan Perwira 
Angkatan Darat
Army Officer Training Center
RPKAD Resimen Para Komando 
Angkatan Darat
Army Paracommando Regiment
S Sundanese
Seskoad Sekolah Staf dan Komando 
Angkatan Darat
Army Staff and Command 
School
Seskogab Sekolah Staf dan Komando 
Gabungan
Joint Services’ Staff and 
Command School
SI Siliwangi
THE FIFTH DEVELOPMENT CABINET 
As Announced by President Suharto on March 21, 1988 
(Asterisks denote active or retired military officers)
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Minister of:
Home Affairs
Foreign Affairs
Defense and Security
Justice
Information
Finance
Trade
Industries
Agriculture
Forestry
Mining and Energy 
Public Works 
Communications 
Cooperative Affairs 
Manpower 
Transmigration 
Tourism, Posts, and 
Telecommunications 
Education and Culture 
Health
Religious Affairs 
Social Affairs
Coordinating Minister for:
Politics and Security 
Economics, Finance, Industry, and 
Development Supervision 
Public W elfare
Ministers of State:
Secretary of State 
National Planning and Development 
(concurrently chairman of the 
National Development Planning 
Board— Bappenas)
Research and Technology 
(concurrently chairman of 
the Board for Research and 
Application o f Technology) 
Population and Environment 
Public Housing 
Youth and Sports 
Reform of State Apparatus 
Women’s Affairs
Junior Ministers:
Cabinet Secretary 
Finance 
Trade 
Industries
*  Rudini
Ali Alatas, S.H.
*  L  B. (Benny) Murdani
*  Ismail Saleh, S.H.
Harmoko
Prof. Dr. J. B. Sumariin
Dr. Ariftn Siregar
Ir. Hartarto
Ir. Wardoyo
Ir. Nasjrul Harahap
Ir. Drs. Ginandjar Kartasasmita
Ir. Radinal Moechtar
Ir. Azwar Anas
*  Bustanil Arifin, S.H.
Drs. Cosmas Batubara 
Sugiarto
*  Susilo Sudarman 
Prof. Dr. Fuad Hassan 
Dr. Adhyatma, M .P A
H. Munawir Syadzali, M.A. 
Prof. Dr. Haryati Soebadio
*  Sudomo
Drs. Radius Prawiro
*  Soepardjo Rustam
Drs. Moerdiono
Prof. Dr. Saleh Afrff
Prof. Dr. Ir. B. J. Habibie 
Prof. Dr. Emil Salim 
Ir. Siswono Judohusodo 
Ir. Akbar Tanjung 
Ir. Sarwono Kusumaatmadja 
Ny. A. Sulasikin Moerpratomo
Drs. Saadillah Mursjid, M .P A  
Drs. Nasrudin Sumintapura, M.A. 
Dr. J. Sudradjat Djiwandono 
Ir. T . Ariwibowo
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Agriculture
National Planning and 
Development (concurrently 
Bappenas vice chairman)
In addition to ' these ministers, there are 
state ministerial ranks. They are:
Commander of the Armed Forces 
of the Republic of Indonesia 
Attorney General 
Governor of the Central Bank
Dr. Ir. Sjarifudin Baharsjah
Prof. Dr. Benny Sugiarto Muljana 
i—ranking state officials who are accorded
*  Try Sutrisno
Sukarton Marmosudjono, S.H.
Dr. Adrianus Mooy
